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Abstract
This paper employs Bayesian estimation to uncover the central
bank preferences of the five Latin American inflation targeting coun-
tries with floating exchange rates: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico,
and Peru. The target weights of each country’s central bank loss
function are estimated using a medium-scale small open economy
New Keynesian model with imperfect exchange-rate pass-through
under either complete or incomplete international asset markets.
Bayesian model comparison selects: (i) unambiguously the com-
plete markets model version; (ii) the model specification with ex-
plicit concern for real exchange rate stabilization, with the excep-
tion of Peru. Our results suggest that the central banks of Mexico
and Peru are closest to following a strict inflation targeting regime,
whereas Brazil, Chile, and Colombia also assign a sizeable weight to
output gap and real exchange rate stabilization. Finally, the esti-
mated preference weights for each central bank are shown to credibly
reflect their legal mandates.
JEL codes: C51, E52, F41.
Keywords: Bayesian model comparison; international asset mar-
ket structure; central bank preferences; inflation targeting; Latin
America; small open economies; monetary policy.
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1 Introduction
For many central banks in both developed and developing countries, in-
flation targeting (IT) has become the operational monetary framework of
choice to achieve price stability.1 According to the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) (see, e.g., Jahan, 2012), since the adoption of IT by
New Zealand in December 1989, there are now 28 IT central banks world-
wide, of which 6 currently originate from Latin America: Brazil, Chile, and
Colombia all adopted IT in 1999, shortly followed by Mexico (2001), Peru
(2002), and Guatemala (2005) (see Table 1).2 While there is some empir-
ical evidence to suggest that IT has been successful in reducing inflation
in developing countries (see, e.g., Batini and Laxton, 2007; Goncalves and
Salles, 2008; Lin and Ye, 2009; Lee, 2011),3 little is known about the policy
preferences of central banks operating in these countries.4 As discussed
by Castelnuovo and Surico (2004) and Ilbas (2010, 2012), such informa-
tion can help in evaluating the performance of central banks, as well as
improving our understanding of monetary policy actions and its effects on
the formation of expectations by private agents.
The aim of this paper is to use Bayesian estimation techniques to un-
cover and compare the central bank preferences of the five Latin American
inflation targeting (LAIT) countries operating under a floating exchange-
rate regime.5 Since the IT framework can be considered as “constrained
discretion”(Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997), we assume that in each coun-
try monetary policy is conducted under optimal discretion (Dennis, 2007).
Each central bank is assumed to optimally set the nominal interest rate by
1See, e.g., Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Carare and Stone (2006), Roger
(2010), Hammond (2011), Jahan (2012).
2As Table 1 reveals, there is significant heterogeneity across these 6 Latin American
countries in terms of the inflation target set and their performance in steering actual
inflation towards the target.
3Lee (2011) finds that IT has been particularly successful in reducing inflation in
Colombia, while no significant reductions were found for Chile. In contrast to much
of the earlier literature, Brito and Bystedt (2010) find no evidence that IT improves
economic performance in developing countries, as measured by the behavior of inflation
and output growth.
4There is also some evidence to suggest that IT has reduced the dispersion of long-
run inflation expectations in developing countries. See Capistrán and Ramos-Francia
(2010) for further details.
5We exclude Guatemala from the analysis because its exchange-rate regime is defined
by the IMF as a “stabilized arrangement”—see Table 1.
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minimizing a quadratic loss function that includes four specific policy ob-
jectives: price stability via control of inflation, stabilizing the output gap,
reducing real exchange rate variability, and nominal interest rate smooth-
ing. The weight attributed to each policy objective will depend on the in-
stitutional preferences of each central bank, which we can make inferences
about using estimates of the respective Bayesian posterior distributions.
The structural model used to represent the LAIT economies is a dy-
namic medium-scale small open economy New Keynesian model. Follow-
ing the modeling frameworks of Monacelli (2005), Kam et al. (2009), and
Justiniano and Preston (2010), we allow for imperfect exchange-rate pass-
through (ERPT) such that the law of one price fails to hold. However, in
similar set-ups the literature has assumed that international asset mar-
kets are either complete, e.g., as in Galí and Monacelli (2005), Mona-
celli (2005), and Kam et al. (2009), or incomplete, e.g., as in Adolfson
et al. (2007) and Justiniano and Preston (2010). Instead, we consider
both international asset market structures and use the Bayes factor to com-
pare between them.6 Using the popular Random-Walk Metropolis-Hastings
Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm, we present posterior estimates and
convergence diagnostics for both the structural parameters and the persis-
tence and standard deviations of the shocks we consider as most important
for the LAIT economies, including cost-push shocks to the prices of im-
ported and domestic goods, and shocks to the risk premium, the terms of
trade, and technology.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that for the LAITs
in our sample the assumption of complete asset markets is unambiguously
preferred to the alternative of incomplete asset markets, as commonly but
simplistically modeled by a riskless bond-only financial system. The supe-
riority of the marginal likelihoods under complete asset markets is always
suffi ciently large to suggest strong statistical evidence in favor of complete
markets over the incomplete asset markets version.
Second, all five central banks are strongly concerned about stabilizing
inflation and smoothing the nominal interest rate. In particular, relative to
6Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) perform a similar Bayesian model comparison in a two-
country open-economy model framework estimated for the United States and the Euro
Area.
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the weight of inflation stabilization, we find that Chile and Peru place very
high weights on interest rate smoothing. Third, there is significant het-
erogeneity amongst the five central banks concerning the target weights of
output gap stabilization and real exchange rate stabilization. Our analysis
suggests that Mexico and Peru show little concern for the stabilization of
the output gap, whereas Brazil, Chile, and Colombia assign sizable weights.
While all the LAIT central banks except that of Peru are concerned about
real exchange rate stabilization, only Brazil and Chile are found to assign
a sizable weight to minimizing real exchange rate fluctuations.
Overall, Peru and, less so, Mexico show evidence of implementing a
strict inflation targeting regime, whereas Brazil, Chile, and Colombia ap-
pear much more flexible in terms of their macroeconomic policy objectives.
Our estimated preference weights for the four policy objectives are shown
to be broadly consistent with regard to the respective legal mandates of
the five LAIT central banks.
In terms of the estimated key structural parameters influencing the
endogenous propagation mechanism of the model, we find that these are
statistically reliable, economically plausible, and broadly comparable to
analogous estimates for other countries available in the literature using
non-Bayesian econometric methods. For example, the estimated elasticity
of substitution between home and foreign goods is within the typical range
reported in Corsetti et al. (2008). Further, the estimated inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is also clustered tightly for all five LAITs in a
typical range for other economies. With the exception of Chile, our esti-
mates also reveal lower habit persistence than that for advanced economies,
including those reported by Kam et al. (2009).
In terms of the sources of exogenous fluctuations affecting the five LAIT
economies, our results indicate a high relative volatility (measured by the
posterior mean standard deviation) for cost-push shocks to both imported
and domestic goods, terms of trade shocks and, less so, productivity shocks,
dominating in most of the LAIT economies. For four of our five LAIT
economies, risk premium shocks are estimated to be the most persistent,
whereas terms of trade shocks are estimated to be the least persistent.
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There are few papers that have used Bayesian techniques to estimate
central bank preferences in an open-economy setting.7 Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) find, examining four advanced IT economies, that the central banks
of Canada and the UK react to the nominal exchange rate in the monetary
policy rule, whereas the central banks of Australia and New Zealand do
not. Kam et al. (2009) estimate the central bank preferences for three
developed IT countries, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand under op-
timal discretionary monetary policy. They find that the central banks of
these countries all have very similar preferences: the highest priority is
inflation stabilization, followed by interest rate smoothing, with no con-
cern for stabilizing the output gap (with the exception of Australia) and
the real exchange rate. Palma and Portugal (2014) estimate the model of
Kam et al. (2009) using Brazilian data. They find that the major concern
of the central bank of Brazil is inflation stabilization, followed by interest
rate smoothing, real exchange rate stabilization, and output gap stabiliza-
tion. While the estimation approach adopted in this paper is similar to
Kam et al. (2009), who assume complete asset markets, we additionally
examine the model fit of incomplete asset markets. Moreover, Rabanal
and Tuesta (2010) show that the extent of international financial market
integration affects both the Bayesian estimates of the parameters and the
transmission mechanism of shocks. Our analysis emphasizes the implica-
tions for Bayesian estimation of using different international asset markets
assumptions in fitting the data, particularly when uncovering central bank
preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the data and explains the estimation strategy.
Section 4 reports our main results. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
This section outlines the model economy, which is based on the small
open economy frameworks of Monacelli (2005), Kam et al. (2009), and
7In a closed-economy setting, Ilbas (2010, 2012) estimates the preferences of the
European Central Bank and the US Federal Reserve, respectively, under commitment
using the structural models of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007).
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Justiniano and Preston (2010). The domestic economy is populated by
infinitely-lived households of measure one, a continuum of domestic good
producers, a continuum of retail firms who import foreign goods at compet-
itive world prices, and a central bank. Both domestic-goods producing and
foreign-goods importing retail firms are assumed to operate under monop-
olistic competition and set prices in a staggered fashion according to Calvo
(1983). Market power in the retail sector for imported goods results in
incomplete ERPT and thus the law of one price fails to hold. We consider
two alternative model structures where international financial markets are
either assumed to be complete, as in Galí and Monacelli (2005), Monacelli
(2005), and Kam et al. (2009), denoted as CAM henceforth, or incomplete,
as in Adolfson et al. (2007) and Justiniano and Preston (2010), denoted
as IAM. Following Dennis (2007) and Kam et al. (2009), the inflation-
targeting central bank is assumed to minimize a quadratic loss function
under discretion. In what follows, asterisks conventionally denote foreign
variables, and subscriptsH (F ) denote variables ofHome (Foreign) origin.
2.1 Households































The parameter η > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods, α ∈ (0, 1) is the share of foreign goods in the domestic
consumption bundle, and ε > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution
between the varieties of goods produced within H or F , where i, j ∈ [0, 1].
The optimal allocation of expenditures between domestic and imported
goods yields the following aggregate demand conditions:
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where the consumer price index Pt is given by:
Pt =
[










where ẽt denotes the (home) nominal exchange rate. The relative price of






The representative household chooses consumption Ct and labor Nt to












where the discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1), σ, ϕ > 0 are the inverse elasticities
of intertemporal substitution and labor supply, respectively, Ht ≡ hCt−1 is
an external habit variable with h ∈ (0, 1). The household during period t
supplies labor (hours) Nt to domestic firms receiving income from wages
Wt and profits from the ownership of domestic and retail firms Πt.
In what follows we consider alternative model versions depending on
whether international financial markets are assumed to be complete or
incomplete. Under incomplete asset markets, let Bt−1 and B∗t−1 denote
the holdings of home and foreign risk-free bonds that mature in period t
with corresponding interest rates r̃t and r̃∗t . Following Kollmann (2002),
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), Benigno (2009), and Justiniano and Pre-
ston (2010), we assume that there is a debt-elastic interest rate premium
ωt−1(Dt−1, εq,t−1) given by:
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where εq,t−1 is a risk premium shock and Dt−1 is defined as the ratio of the
real quantity of foreign bond holdings (expressed in terms of domestic cur-
rency) to steady state output Yss. If the household is a borrower (Dt > 0),
it must pay a premium over the interest rate. The chosen functional form
for the debt-elastic interest rate premium is suffi cient to ensure that bond
holdings are stationary in a log-linear approximation to the model.8 Alter-
natively, Alonso-Carrera and Kam (2016) close their incomplete markets
model by endogenizing the discount factor β. One advantage of their ap-
proach is that it does not require a specific law of motion for foreign bond
holdings, thus avoiding the introduction of an additional state variable into
the analysis. We favor a debt-elastic interest rate premium to induce sta-
tionarity as there is empirical evidence for emerging economies supporting
a debt-sensitive interest rate (see, for example, Uribe and Yue, 2006).






































Equation (9) is the intratemporal labor supply condition, (10) is the in-
tertemporal consumption Euler equation, and (11) is the interest rate par-
ity condition.
8For an in-depth discussion of the stationarity problem of small open-economy models
with incomplete asset markets, see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
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Under the alternative assumption of CAM and given identical global
















so that perfect risk sharing obtains (from the analogous first-order condi-


















Equation (13) shows that under CAM real exchange rate growth equals the
marginal rate of substitution in consumption growth across countries.9
The key difference between the two financial market structures is that
complete asset markets implies perfect risk sharing. Incomplete asset mar-
kets breaks this link (see Chari et al., 2002, and Rabanal and Tuesta, 2010).
Moreover, as shown by Alonso-Carrera and Kam (2016), under imperfect
international risk sharing there is an explicit real exchange-rate channel
that can exacerbate the domestic inflation to output gap trade-off.
2.2 Domestic Good Producers
The domestic goods market is comprised of a continuum of monopolistically
competitive firms i ∈ [0, 1] that produce differentiated goods. Domestic
firms hire labor N to produce output using a linear production technology:
YH,t(i) = εa,tNt(i), (14)
where εa,t is an exogenous domestic technology shock, and given competi-





where MCt denotes real marginal cost.
9For more details, see, e.g., Monacelli (2005) and Kam et al. (2009).
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Domestic firms set prices according to Calvo (1983), where in each
period there is a constant probability 1− θH that a firm will be randomly
selected to adjust its price, while a fraction 0 < θH < 1 adjusts their prices







where δH ∈ [0, 1] measures the degree of inflation indexation. For simplic-
ity, we assume that the export price of the domestic good is determined
by the law of one price: P ∗Ht = (1/St)PH,t. A domestic firm i, faced with
changing its price at time t, has to choose PH,t(i) to maximize its expected




















































The aggregate price level evolves according to:
PH,t =
(1− θH)(P̃H,t)1−ε + θH (PH,t−1(PH,t−1
PH,t−2
)δH)1−ε 11−ε . (19)
2.3 Retail Firms
The retail market is comprised of a continuum of monopolistically compet-
itive firms j ∈ [0, 1] that import differentiated goods from abroad. Similar
to domestic firms, retail firms also set prices according to Calvo (1983)
where in each period there is a constant probability 1 − θF that a retail
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firm will be randomly selected to adjust its price.10 Faced with changing
its price at time t, a retail firm j importing a good at cost ẽtP ∗F,t(j) chooses






















































and the aggregate price index for imports:
PF,t =
(1− θF )(P̃F,t)1−ε + θF (PF,t−1(PF,t−1
PF,t−2
)δF)1−ε 11−ε . (23)
2.4 Market Clearing
Goods market clearing for domestic firms requires:






























Market clearing for domestic bonds requires:
Bt = 0. (25)
10The parameter θF governs the degree of ERPT.
McKnight, Mihailov and Pompa Rangel (Accepted: 18 Dec 2019) 11
2.5 The Log-Linearized Model
The model is log-linearized around a deterministic zero-inflation steady
state, where bond holdings are zero and the terms of trade are equal to
Sss = 1. Let lowercase letters denote the log-deviations of the respec-
tive variables from their steady-state values: i.e., xt = ln(Xt/Xss). Log-
linearizing the consumption Euler equation of the domestic household (10)
yields:
ct − hct−1 = Et(ct+1 − hct)−
1− h
σ
(rt − Etπt+1). (26)
Log-linearizing (18) and (19) gives the aggregate supply condition for domestic-
produced goods:





where πH,t = pH,t − pH,t−1 and
mct = ϕyt − (1 + ϕ)εa,t + αst +
σ
1− h(ct − hct−1),
which is obtained after combining (9), (15), the aggregate version of (14),
and noting that the log-linearized version of the CPI index (4) implies
pt − pH,t = αst after using (6).
Log-linearizing (22) and (23) gives the aggregate supply condition for im-
ported retail goods:
πF,t−δFπF,t−1 = βEt(πF,t+1−δFπF,t)+
(1− βθF )(1− θF )
θF
(ψF,t+εF,t), (28)
where πF,t = pF,t − pF,t−1 and the law of one price gap ψF,t is defined as:
ψF,t ≡ et + p∗t − pF,t.
Log-linearizing equations (4)—(6) and using the above definition of ψF,t
yields the following relationship for the real exchange rate and the terms
of trade:
qt = et + p
∗
t − pt = ψF,t + (1− α)st. (29)
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First-differencing the log-linearized version of equation (6) yields:
st − st−1 = πF,t − πH,t + εs,t, (30)
where εs,t is an exogenous terms of trade shock, and first-differencing the
log-linearized version of the CPI index (4) gives:
πt = (1− α)πH,t + απF,t, (31)
where πt = pt − pt−1.
Under incomplete asset markets, the real interest rate parity condition
is obtained by first-differencing (29) and combining with the log-linearized
version of (11):
(rt − Etπt+1)− (r∗t − Etπ∗t+1) = Et(qt+1 − qt)− χ(dt + εq,t). (32)
The disturbance term εq,t captures time-varying deviations from real inter-
est rate parity. Log-linearizing the budget constraint (8) implies:11
ct + dt =
dt−1
β
− α(st + ψF,t) + yt, (33)
where dt = log(Dt) ≡ log(ẽtB∗t /YssPt) is domestic-currency real foreign
bond holdings (relative to steady-state output).
Under complete asset markets, equations (32) and (33) are replaced by
the following log-linear real interest parity condition:
(rt − Etπt+1)− (r∗t − Etπ∗t+1) + εq,t = Et(qt+1 − qt). (34)
Finally, the goods market clearing condition (24) implies:
yt = (1− α)ct + αηqt + αηst + αy∗t . (35)
11Similar to Justiniano and Preston (2010), in equilibrium household nominal income
WtNt + Πt = PH,tYt + (PF,t − ẽtP ∗t )CF,t.
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We assume that the stochastic processes for technology, the terms of
trade, and risk-premium shocks follow an independent AR(1) process:
εx,t = ρxεx,t−1 + vx,t, where ρx ∈ (0, 1), vx ∼ iid(0, σ2x) (36)
for x = a, s, q, and the cost-push shocks in the domestic and retail sectors
follow an i.i.d. process: εH ∼ i.i.d.(0, σH) and εF ∼ i.i.d. (0, σF ). Following
Kam et al. (2009), we further assume that the foreign country variables






















where vπ∗,t, vy∗,t, vr∗,t ∼ N(0, I3).
Given the specification for monetary policy, the processes for {εa,t, εq,t,




t } described by (36) and (37), and the cost-push shocks
{εH,t, εF,t}, the respective system of equations (26)—(35) determines the
following ten endogenous variables {ct, yt, dt, qt, st, ψF,t, rt, πt, πH,t, πF,t}
under IAM or nine endogenous variables under CAM, excluding dt from the
vector.
2.6 Central Bank Preferences
As is standard in the literature, we assume that the central bank minimizes
a one-period ad-hoc quadratic loss function where monetary policy targets
inflation, the output gap, and interest rate smoothing.12 In addition, fol-
lowing Kam et al. (2009) the central bank can also target the real exchange
rate. Consequently, the loss function is given by:








t + µr(rt − rt−1)2
]
. (38)
12An alternative approach would be to derive an approximate welfare-based loss func-
tion using the preferences of the household. While this approach is theoretically ap-
pealing (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003; Galí, 2015), it does not carry over easily to open
economies (see, e.g., Benigno and Benigno, 2003; Monacelli, 2005). In particular, an ac-
curate quadratic approximation of household welfare can be obtained in open economy
models only under special assumptions on household preferences and on the value of the
trade elasticity parameter η.
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The weight assigned to the annual inflation rate π̃t ≡
∑3
i=0 πt−i/4 is nor-
malized to one and the weights µy, µq, µr ∈ [0,+∞) represent the relative
importance assigned to output gap stabilization, real exchange rate stabi-
lization, and interest rate smoothing. The loss function specification given
by (38) is consistent with flexible inflation targeting as described by Svens-
son (1999). Interest rate smoothing is included to capture monetary policy
inertia.13 As discussed by Svensson (2000), the real exchange rate plays
a prominent role in the monetary policy transmission mechanism in small
open economies.
We further assume that the central bank minimizes (38) subject to the
structural equations (26)—(35) under discretion.14 We employ the algorithm
of Dennis (2007) to compute solutions to a linear-quadratic Markov perfect
equilibrium (LQ-MPE) problem.15 Following Kam et al. (2009), we add
a noise term εr,t ∼ N(0, σ2r) to the resulting optimal interest rate rule
rt(εt, zt−1) to capture imperfections in the setting of interest rates (i.e., an
exogenous monetary policy shock).
3 Estimation
3.1 Data
To estimate the model we use quarterly data for each of the five LAIT
countries. The Foreign economy is proxied by the United States (US). All
data were downloaded from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics,
the OECD’s National Accounts, and statistical tables published by the
central bank of each country. Since the LAIT countries switched to IT
at different periods during the late 1990s and early 2000s (see Table 1),
the sample period differs for each country. To remove any country-specific
noise in the data, the first few years of data after the adoption of IT are
omitted from the sample. Specifically, the sample period for each country
13See Ilbas (2012) and McKnight and Mihailov (2015) for further discussion on the
reasons behind its inclusion.
14When solving (38) under discretion, the central bank treats the problem as one of
sequential optimization, whereas under commitment, the central bank credibly commits
to a policy plan.
15For further details, see Dennis (2007) and Kam et al. (2009).
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used in the estimations is as follows: 2004:1 —2014:4 for Brazil, 2002:1 —
2014:4 for Chile, 2003:1 —2014:4 for Colombia, 2002:1 —2014:4 for Mexico,
and 2005:1 —2014:4 for Peru.
For comparability with the closest literature, we estimate both asset
market model versions, CAM and IAM, using the same 9 observables and
the same 9 shocks as those in Kam et al. (2009).16 As the model features
9 exogenous shock processes {εa,t, εq,t, εr,t, εs,t, εH,t, εF,t, vπ∗,t, vr∗,t, vy∗,t},
9 observable time series are needed to avoid stochastic singularity. For this
reason, we treat dt in the IAM model version as a latent state variable and
do not use it as a potential observable in the estimation.17 Thus, our data
set contains the following 9 observable variables: imported goods inflation
denominated in domestic currency (πF,t), the terms of trade (measured as
the price of imports to exports) (st), the real exchange rate (computed
using the nominal exchange rate defined as national currency per 1 USD)
(qt), domestic real GDP (yt), domestic CPI inflation (πt), the nominal in-
terest rate (rt), US CPI inflation (π∗t ), US real output (y
∗
t ), and the US
federal funds rate (r∗t ). All variables are expressed in logs and detrended
using the Hodrick—Prescott filter, except inflation rates and interest rates,
which are expressed in quarterly percentage change. Since monetary policy
in our framework is driven using an output gap methodology, for yt we use
the Hodrick—Prescott filter to construct an output gap of deviations from
the trend. As is customary in the estimation of DSGE models, all vari-
ables, including those in percentage terms, are demeaned to approximate
theoretical deviations from the steady state.
In order to assess the role of the real exchange rate in the policy ob-
jective of each central bank, we follow Kam et al. (2009) in estimating
two versions of the model, µq > 0 versus µq = 0 in (38), under both com-
plete and incomplete asset markets to see which is more probable (given
the same observables and shocks) via the comparison of Bayesian marginal
likelihood (i.e., posterior odds, assuming equal prior model probabilities).
16In order to conduct a meaningful Bayesian model comparison pairwise, both asset
markets structure versions need to be estimated using the same observable time series
and the same number of shocks. For further discussion, see, e.g., Merola (2015).
17In the working paper version, McKnight et al. (2016), we also estimated the incom-
plete asset market model using 10 observables, by including a time-series for interna-
tional currency reserves as a proxy for dt and adding a 10th shock process to preferences.
Similar conclusions on central bank preference weights were obtained.
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3.2 Methodology and Prior Selection
The model M is estimated using Bayesian methods.18 We update the a
priori beliefs about the parameter vector θ, represented by the prior density
p(θ|M) in view of the information contained in the observed sample Y .19
According to Bayes Theorem (see, e.g., Herbst and Schorfheide, 2016),
p(θ|Y,M) = p(Y |θ,M)p(θ|M)∫
p(Y |θ,M)p(θ|M)dθ , (39)
this updating generates a posterior distribution p(θ|Y,M). The denomi-
nator in (39) is commonly known as the marginal likelihood of the data
(or marginal data density) associated withM . As discussed by Herbst and
Schorfheide (2016), among others, Bayesian inference amounts to character-
izing the properties of the posterior distribution p(θ|Y,M). Usually, poste-
rior samplers are employed that generate sequences of draws θj, j = 1, ..., J
from p(θ|Y,M). As is common in the literature, we apply the Random-
Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RWMH) Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
algorithm to obtain draws from the posterior distribution.20 For each coun-
try, 2000000 RWMH-MCMC draws and 2500 Kalman filter iterations were
obtained, where the first half of the draws was discarded (or burnt-in) in
order to remove initial condition effects.
As the posterior density (39) is derived by combining the prior density
p(θ|M) with the likelihood function p(Y |θ,M), the selection of priors for
each parameter plays a fundamental role in Bayesian estimation. The pri-
ors used in our estimates are summarized in Table 2. As is customary, we
conform to the established conventions in selecting the prior densities: we
use the beta distribution for parameters in the interval [0, 1], the inverse
18Bayesian methods are described in detail in Gelman et al. (2004) and Koop (2006),
among others. Their application to DSGE models has been expanding rapidly and
includes key references such as Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), An and Schorfheide
(2007), Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2010), DeJong and Dave (2011), Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2011), Miao (2014), Herbst and Schorfheide (2016), Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2016).
19The parameter vector θ describes the preferences, technology, central bank policy
weights, and exogenous shock processes of the model M .
20The pseudo-code for this popular algorithm is detailed in Appendix B of Kam et al.
(2009).
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gamma distribution for the standard deviations of the stochastic innova-
tions [0,∞), and the gamma distribution for the rest.
Due to limited information in the data set, some structural parameters
cannot be estimated with suffi cient precision, and were therefore calibrated
prior to estimation. For each country, we calibrate the import share in
domestic consumption, α, to values corresponding to the sample average
share of imports of goods and services in consumption: we set α to 0.20
for Brazil; 0.51 for Chile; 0.29 for Colombia; 0.44 for Mexico; and 0.35
for Peru.21 As is common in the literature, for all countries the discount
factor (β) is fixed at 0.99 and the debt-elastic interest rate parameter (χ),
appearing only in the IAM version, is fixed at 0.05 consistent with the
estimates of Selaive and Tuesta (2003 a, b).22
We follow Kam et al. (2009) and assume that the prior distributions
for the central bank preference parameters µy, µq, and µr are exactly the
same. Consequently, any resulting differences in the posterior distributions
of these (as well as the other) parameters will be due to the data itself.
4 Results
Table 3 summarizes the marginal likelihood across the four estimated model
versions by country. For each of the five LAIT economies, tables 4 and 5
report the results of the Bayesian RWMH-MCMC estimation for the unre-
stricted (µq > 0) and restricted (µq = 0) model versions. Table 4 presents
the results under the assumption of complete asset markets, whereas Table
5 summarizes the results under incomplete asset markets. Tables 4 and
5 also present a summary of the posterior mean and standard deviation
estimates for the central bank preference weights obtained for each model
version. Figures 1—5 depict, for the preferred model version by country,
the estimated posterior distributions for the structural parameters. Tables
21These values correspond to the average quarterly share (in our whole sample, 1999:1-
2014:4) of real imports of goods and services in real consumption by country. Since
direct information for the latter ratio is usually not released in statistical publications,
we obtained it indirectly, by the ratio of the average quarterly share of real imports of
goods and services in GDP to the average quarterly share of real consumption in real
GDP.
22Using GMM, Selaive and Tuesta (2003 a, b) estimate χ to be in the range of 0.004
and 0.071 for a sample of OECD countries.
What Do Latin American Inflation Targeters Care About? 18
6—10 report the corresponding posterior estimates and convergence diag-
nostics for both the structural parameters and the persistence and standard
deviations of the shocks, again, for the preferred model version.23
4.1 Complete versus Incomplete Asset Markets: Bayesian
Model Comparison
We begin the discussion of our estimation results by first performing a
Bayesian comparison between the model versions under complete and in-
complete asset markets. Table 3 summarizes the marginal likelihoods for
the µq > 0 (unrestricted) and µq = 0 (restricted) cases under both the
CAM and IAM model versions. More precisely, the (log-) marginal like-
lihood, ln p (Y |Mi) or ln p (Y |Mj), for each of these pairs of models by
country, Mi or Mj, is compared, based on using the common data set, Y .
The highest marginal likelihood per country is typed in bold fonts. By in-
spection of Table 3, it is clear that for all LAIT countries and the two model
specifications considered, µq > 0 (unrestricted) and µq = 0 (restricted), the
complete asset markets version is unanimously preferred by the data.
We also note that, according to the typical Bayesian model comparison
criteria (e.g., Kass and Raftery, 1995), the superiority of the highest mar-
ginal likelihood over the second largest marginal likelihood for each country
is always suffi ciently large to ensure very strong statistical evidence in favor
of the complete asset markets version. Using the value of the Kass-Raftery
(1995, p. 777) criterion of the Bayes factor (BFij) for two estimated and
compared models i and j, 2 lnBFij ≡ 2 ln p(y|Mi)p(y|Mj) > |10|, it can be verified
in Table 3 that this criterion is satisfied marginally even in the “tight-
est”case, Colombia, and much more convincingly in all the remaining four
LAIT countries.
It is important to note that the summary statistics for the Bayesian
estimation reported in tables 4 (CAM) and 5 (IAM) (involving 20 sets of
estimated results) are overall of a good quality.24
23All figures and tables for the other model versions are available online in the zip
replication archive provided as supplementary material.
24For three cases of the IAM model version, the acceptance rate is too low (below 5%)
and the indeterminacy rate is too high (above 40%).
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Focusing on the results reported in the columns of Table 4 under the
preferred CAM model reveals that the model specification with explicit
concern for real exchange rate stabilization is favored for nearly all LAIT
central banks. With the exception of Peru, the results suggest that the
model µq > 0 is a better fit of the data in terms of having a statistically
meaningful higher marginal likelihood.
For each model specification, Table 4 also summarizes the parameter
estimates associated with the loss function of each central bank. By in-
spection, while there is significant heterogeneity in terms of the specific pa-
rameter weights estimated for each country, three main conclusions arise.
First, there is significant evidence that all five central banks are concerned
about smoothing the nominal interest rate. In particular, relative to the
weight of inflation stabilization (normalized at 1), we find that Chile (1.14)
and Peru (1.78) place very high weights on interest rate smoothing. Al-
though Colombia is found to have the lowest weight, this is still sizable
(0.35). For the four countries concerned about real exchange rate volatility
(i.e., where the µq > 0 model version is preferable in terms of marginal
likelihoods), the estimates for Colombia (0.10) and Mexico (0.06) yield low
weights, suggesting the low importance of real exchange rate stabilization
in these countries. In stark contrast, both Brazil and Chile assign signifi-
cant identical weights to real exchange rate stabilization (0.31). In the case
of Chile, this is nearly double the weight assigned to output gap stabiliza-
tion (0.17). Third, while Mexico and Peru show little concern for output
gap stabilization, Brazil (0.73), Colombia (0.44), and Chile (0.17) place
a sizeable weight on it. Overall, Peru, and less so, Mexico are found to
be strict inflation targeters, whereas Brazil, Colombia, and Chile are flexi-
ble inflation targeters that include other macroeconomic policy objectives
other than inflation.
It is important to stress the role of the asset market structure in gen-
erating these findings. By inspection of Table 5, while all five LAITs now
support the unrestricted model (µq > 0) under IAM, only Mexico assigns
a sizeable weight (0.37) to real exchange rate stabilization. Now all five
LAITs come out as flexible inflation targeters, with the estimated weight
of output stabilization varying from 0.17 in Brazil to 0.83 in Chile. What is
less controversial is that all five LAITs assign usually the strongest weight
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(after that of inflation) to interest rate smoothing, no matter the asset mar-
ket structure. The above exercise highlights the sensitivity of the Bayesian
estimates for the central bank policy weights to the assumption of interna-
tional asset markets (in)completeness. Our analysis thus emphasizes the
importance of performing a model comparison of alternative asset markets
assumptions in Bayesian estimation, in order to distinguish which asset
market structure is a better fit of the data, such that the central bank
preferences uncovered are not misspecified.25
4.2 Posterior Shapes and Convergence Diagnostics
Figures 1—5 show both the assumed prior (dashed curve) and the estimated
posterior (solid curve) distributions (also indicating the posterior mean by
the vertical line) for each structural parameter for the five LAIT economies.
To save space, we only include in these figures and the subsequent tables
the model version that was preferred (across the four models studied) by
the Bayesian comparison exercise discussed above.26 By inspection, the
posterior distributions are generally unimodal and nicely shaped in most
cases. However, there are a few exceptions. For, instance, the coeffi cient of
relative risk aversion, σ, is not estimated with a good degree of precision
for all our five countries except Chile, and this can be seen in the respective
figures as well as by checking the convergence diagnostics in the respective
subsequent tables 6—10. Estimation is sometimes not satisfactory for the
standard deviations of the shock process innovations either, as can be seen
in these tables. While these two issues are common problems, e.g., also
reflected in the estimation results reported by Kam et al. (2009), there
are some further problems here in the LAIT context, e.g., affecting the
convergence diagnostics of some structural parameters, and in particular
some of the policy weights. We mention this as a note of caution, as those
remaining issues could not be removed after many attempts of re-estimation
and fine-tuning.
25Rabanal and Tuesta (2010) find that the asset markets structure affects the degree
of model misspecification and changes significantly the Bayesian estimates, including
the reported policy parameters.
26Analogous figures for the remaining model versions for each country are available
online in the zip replication archive provided as supplementary material.
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Tables 6—10 report the posterior mean and standard deviation esti-
mates, the 95% confidence sets for the posterior estimates, and selected di-
agnostic tests for MCMC convergence. In these tables, NSE stands for the
numerical standard error, which approximates the true posterior moment
as proposed by Geweke (1992). The NSE reported for each country uses
an 8% autocovariance tapered estimate. The G p-values report the p-value
associated with Geweke’s (1992) chi-squared convergence test.27 The last
column of tables 6—10 reports the Brooks-Gelman (B-G) univariate shrink
factor proposed by Gelman and Rubin (1992) and extended by Brooks and
Gelman (1998).28 By inspection of tables 6—10, we can conclude that our
estimation results are overall satisfactory. The reported convergence test
statistics for the estimated parameters indicate that in general the latter
converge to an invariant distribution.29 There are few exceptions, however,
where the Geweke chi-squared convergence test and the univariate shrink
B-G factor both agree on problems with convergence: σ, ρq, µr, and σs for
Chile; ρq for Colombia; σ, ρq, and µr for Mexico; θF and σa for Peru.
30
4.3 Estimated Structural Parameters Influencing the
Endogenous Propagation
We now check if the estimated key structural parameters that drive the
endogenous propagation mechanism are economically plausible, and how
they compare to analogous earlier estimates.
We obtain estimates for habit persistence that, except for Chile, are
lower than those for advanced economies in the related literature: posterior
mean of 0.91 for Chile, 0.40 for Colombia, 0.38 for Peru, 0.37 for Mexico,
and 0.30 for Brazil. Our estimates of the coeffi cient of relative risk aversion
27If the Markov chain of draws has converged to a stable distribution, one would
expect the means from the two halves of the generated sample to be statistically indis-
tinguishable. The null hypothesis of the test is that the means are equal. Thus, a low
p-value may indicate some evidence of problems in convergence.
28This test runs the chain two or more times from a widely-dispersed starting point
to see if the Markov chain always converges to the same value. Commonly, a B-G factor
below 1.1 is considered as little evidence of dispersion (see, e.g., Gelman et al., 2004).
29The MCMC diagnostics figures illustrating the convergence results discussed here
are available online in the zip replication archive provided as supplementary material.
30Note that Kam et al. (2009) report similar problems for some of the parameters we
enumerated for Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
What Do Latin American Inflation Targeters Care About? 22
vary considerably across the five LAIT countries, but also bear in mind
that the convergence diagnostics were not reliable for this parameter esti-
mate: Brazil (1.82), Colombia (1.77), and Mexico (1.15) are found to have
relatively higher CRRA estimates, while Chile (0.20) and, notably, Peru
(0.01) are found to have a low degree of estimated relative risk aversion.
The inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is estimated within the
usual range, 1.51 in Brazil, 1.87 in Chile, 1.49 in Colombia, 1.47 in Mexico,
and 1.58 in Peru. The estimated elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods stays always within the typical range of estimates found
in the empirical literature of 0.1—2.0 (see, e.g., Corsetti et al., 2008): 1.18
for Brazil, 0.11 for Chile, 0.79 for Colombia, 0.67 for Mexico, and 1.22 for
Peru.
The degree of domestic-output versus import price stickiness is consis-
tently estimated across all five LAIT countries to be, roughly, one-and-a-
half to twice higher in favor of the domestic sector: 0.85 versus 0.80 for
Brazil; 0.39 versus 0.27 for Chile; 0.77 versus 0.14 for Colombia; 0.87 versus
0.63 for Mexico; and 0.75 versus 0.38 for Peru. The backward-lookingness
of the NKPC for home prices versus that for import prices is estimated
at 0.93 versus 0.07 in Brazil, 0.60 versus 0.61 in Chile, 0.95 versus 0.31 in
Colombia, 0.98 versus 0.92 in Mexico, and 0.18 versus 0.52 in Peru.
4.4 Estimated Persistence and Volatility of the La-
tent Exogenous Shock Processes
We now turn to the sources of exogenous fluctuations in the LAIT economies,
presenting our set of estimates for persistence and volatility of the struc-
tural shock processes we included in our model.31
As it was thus far, the estimated persistence of the domestic exoge-
nous shock processes across our five LAIT economies reveals some common
features as well as some country-specific differences. The most persistent
domestic shock for Brazil (0.90), Chile (0.88), Colombia (0.86), and Mexico
(0.66) is the risk-premium shock, whereas for Peru (0.86) the technology
31The prior and posterior figures per country, illustrating the results discussed in
the present subsection, are available online in the zip replication archive provided as
supplementary material.
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shock dominates in terms of persistence. Overall, the least persistent do-
mestic shock in four of our five LAIT economies is the terms-of-trade shock
(ranging from 0.21 in Colombia to 0.33 in Mexico), but in Chile the tech-
nology shock is the least persistent (0.27).
Looking at the estimated volatility (measured by the posterior mean of
the standard deviation) of the exogenous shock processes, our main findings
can be summarized as follows. The foreign interest rate shock has the
lowest standard deviation in Chile (0.20), Mexico (0.21), and Peru (0.25),
whereas in Brazil and Colombia the domestic interest rate shock has a lower
estimated standard deviation than the foreign one (0.40 vs. 0.54 and 0.34
vs. 0.53, respectively). In Brazil (23.96) and Colombia (24.22), the cost-
push shock in the imported goods sector dominates, together with that in
the domestic economy and the terms-of-trade shock. In Chile, the terms-of-
trade shock (12.80) displays the highest volatility, followed by the cost-push
shock in the imported goods sector (9.27), and the technology shock (8.53).
In Peru, the risk-premium shock (18.96) is the most volatile, followed by the
technology shock (13.10) and the cost-push shock in the imported goods
sector (11.03). Overall, the terms of trade shock is of a significant and
comparable magnitude in all five LAIT economies, except Mexico (0.39),
with an estimated standard deviation ranging from 8.37 in Peru to 15.33 in
Brazil. In Chile (8.53), Mexico (14.28), and Peru (13.10), the technology
shock plays an important role in driving volatility, whereas in Brazil (1.89)
and Colombia (2.01) it is of a modest, if not non-negligible magnitude.
Our estimates, therefore, show the dominance in generating volatility of
the terms-of-trade, cost-push, and technology shocks for most if not all five
LAIT economies. Only in Peru is the risk-premium shock an important
source of exogenous disturbances, indeed of the highest magnitude (18.96)
compared to the other shocks in this country.
4.5 Comparing Central Bank Mandates with Esti-
mated Policy Preference Weights
In this subsection, we briefly compare the estimated target weights in the
central bank loss functions reported in Table 4 against their actual man-
dates. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) argue that Latin America and the
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Caribbean is a region with low central bank transparency. In this sense, our
results help to shed some light on the decision-making behavior of central
banks. Our loss function estimates are derived from observed outcomes,
and thus allow us to assess whether the actions of central banks are broadly
consistent with their legal mandates.
Among the central banks analyzed in this paper, the Central Bank
of Brazil (BCB) is a special case. While the BCB enjoys administrative
autonomy, it is not fully independent, as the Executive Branch may remove
the members of the bank’s board of directors at any time. Additionally,
the law establishes that BCB’s goals are fully subordinated to the National
Monetary Council (CMN), presently composed by the Minister of Finance,
the Minister of Planning, Development and Management, and the Governor
of the BCB.32 As a result, price stability is not the explicit primary mandate
(Carrière-Swallow et al., 2016), even after adopting an IT regime in 1999.
Given these antecedents, it can be expected that monetary policy in Brazil
would place a non-negligible weight to output gap and real exchange rate
stabilization. Indeed, our results uncovered that BCB assigns the highest
value among all five LAIT central banks to both output gap (0.73) and real
exchange rate (0.31) stabilization.
For the four remaining LAIT countries, the legal framework is very
similar: price stability is the main policy objective for the central banks
in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. In the cases of Colombia, Mex-
ico, and Peru, this goal was elevated to the constitutional level.33 The
stronger legal foundation might explain why Mexico and Peru come closer
to implementing a strict IT regime in our results.
5 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to uncover and compare the central bank
preferences of the five LAIT countries operating under a floating exchange-
32Law 4595, enacted in 1964, establishes that “It is the responsibility of the BCB
to comply with and ensure compliance with the provisions attributed to it by current
legislation and norms issued by the National Monetary Council”.
33Article 373 of the Constitution of Colombia, Article 28 of the Constitution of Mexico,
and Article 84 of the Constitution of Peru clearly mention price stability to be the main
goal of the Central Bank.
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rate regime using Bayesian estimation. We employed a medium-scale New
Keynesian small open economy model that assumed imperfect ERPT and
either complete or incomplete international asset markets. Optimal mon-
etary policy was modeled under discretion, where the central bank mini-
mized a quadratic loss function with four policy objectives: inflation con-
trol, output gap stabilization, real exchange rate volatility reduction, and
nominal interest rate smoothing. The weight attributed to each policy ob-
jective, which depends on the country-specific institutional preferences of
each central bank, was represented in terms of Bayesian posterior distrib-
utions and convergence diagnostics.
The key insights of our analysis can be summarized as follows. In terms
of the typical Bayesian model comparison criteria, we found very strong
statistical evidence in favor of the complete asset markets model over the
incomplete asset markets version. The five LAIT economies we considered
seem to fall broadly into two groups. The first group consists of Mexico
and Peru whose priority targets are to stabilize inflation with a significant
degree of nominal interest rate smoothing, consistent with the adoption
of a strict IT regime. The second group, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia,
have broader policy objectives where each central bank additionally cares
about output gap stabilization consistent with flexible IT. No evidence of
stabilizing the real exchange rate is found for Peru. While we, further, find
evidence that the central banks of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
are concerned about real exchange rate volatility, only Brazil and Chile
are found to assign sizeable weight to reducing its fluctuations. Finally,
we verified that the estimated preference weights of the five LAIT central
banks credibly reflect their legal mandates.
This work can be improved along various dimensions. It could be pos-
sible that preferences were not constant over this period. Personalities of
governors, in addition to the legal mandate of the institution itself, could
also shape the preferences of the central bank. For future research, it would
therefore be interesting to study separate subperiods in the institutional
history or in governor terms of offi ce within a central bank, and compare
across such subperiods the estimated policy preference parameters.
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Country Exchange Rate Year of IT Annual Inflation Average Quarterly Inflation
Regime (2012) Adoption at IT Adoption Inlation since IT Target (2012)
Brazil Floating 1999 3.3 6.6 4.5 ± 1
Chile Free floating 1999 3.2 3.2 3 ± 1
Colombia Floating 1999 9.3 5.1 2 —4
Guatemala Stabilized arrangement 2005 9.2 5.4 5 ± 1
Mexico Free floating 2001 9.0 4.3 3 ± 1
Peru Floating 2002 −0.1 2.9 2 ± 1
Note: Annual inflation is expressed in % per annum. Average quarterly inflation is computed from
the first quarter of the year following IT adoption through the last quarter of 2014, and is expressed
as % per annum. The exchange-rate regime classification is taken from IMF (2012). The inflation
target is extracted from Jahan (2012).
Table 1: The 6 Latin American Inflation Targeters —Some Basic Facts
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Parameters Description Prior pdf Prior Mean Prior SD
Structural Param eters
h degree of hab it p ersistence B 0.6 0.2
σ inverse of elastic ity of intertemporal substitution in consumption Γ 1.0 0.5
φ inverse of Frisch elastic ity of intertemporal lab or supply Γ 1.5 0.25
η elastic ity of substitution b etween home and foreign goods Γ 1.0 0.5
δH degree of indexation in domestic-output markets B 0.7 0.2
δF degree of indexation in imported-goods markets B 0.7 0.2
θH degree of inflation p ersistence in domestic-output markets B 0.5 0.2
θF degree of inflation p ersistence in imported-goods markets B 0.5 0.2
a1 degree of p ersistence in foreign inflation B 0.5 0.2
b2 degree of p ersistence in foreign output B 0.5 0.2
c3 degree of p ersistence in foreign interest rate B 0.5 0.2
ρa degree of p ersistence in technology sho ck B 0.5 0.2
ρq degree of p ersistence in risk prem ium shock B 0.9 0.2
ρs degree of p ersistence in term s of trade sho ck B 0.25 0.2
Relative Policy Target Weights
µq rea l exchange rate stab ilization Γ 0.5 0.3
µy output gap stab ilization Γ 0.5 0.3
µr interest rate smooth ing Γ 0.5 0.3
Standard Deviation of Sho ck Innovations
σH domestic-output cost-push sho ck Inverse Γ 0.5 0.25
σF im ported-goods cost-push sho ck Inverse Γ 0.5 0.25
σa technology sho ck Inverse Γ 1.0 0.4
σq risk prem ium shock Inverse Γ 2.0 0.5
σs term s of trade sho ck Inverse Γ 1.0 0.4
σπ∗ foreign inflation sho ck Inverse Γ 1.0 0.4
σy∗ foreign output sho ck Inverse Γ 1.0 0.4
σr∗ foreign interest rate sho ck Inverse Γ 1.0 0.4
σr interest rate sho ck Inverse Γ 1.0 0.4
Note: Parameters calibrated to a value common to all countries: β = 0.99; χ = 0.05 (IAM).
The parameter α is calibrated to a country-specific value. For the µq= 0 model specification,
the prior and posterior distributions are degenerate at zero.
Table 2: Prior Distributions
McKnight, Mihailov and Pompa Rangel (Accepted: 18 Dec 2019) 41
CAM IAM
µq> 0 µq= 0 µq> 0 µq= 0
Brazil -1431.5 -1469.8 -1502.7 -1472.6
Chile -1591.9 -1606.4 -1665.5 -1771.5
Colombia -1500.4 -1506.2 -1596.3 -1584.4
Mexico -1527.6 -1560.7 -1574.7 -1592.5
Peru -1437.1 -1399.8 -1523.1 -3202.8
Note: The numbers report the marginal likelihood for each model
version; the fonts in bold indicate the model version preferred by
the data for each country.
Table 3: Bayesian Model Comparison —Complete versus Incomplete Asset
Markets
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µq> 0 µq= 0
Brazil (2004—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1431.5 -1469.8
Acceptance Rate (%) 12.93 8.24
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 4.72 18.16
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 2.25 1.93
µq 0.31 (0.12) 0
µy 0.73 (0.22) 0.78 (0.34)
µr 0.53 (0.30) 0.39 (0.18)
Chile (2002—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1591.9 -1606.4
Acceptance Rate (%) 20.50 20.28
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 9.13 14.36
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 1.54 0.68
µq 0.31 (0.11) 0
µy 0.17 (0.09) 0.06 (0.04)
µr 1.14 (0.39) 1.08 (0.17)
Colombia (2003—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1500.4 -1506.2
Acceptance Rate (%) 16.80 18.61
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 5.41 6.31
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 1.78 1.90
µq 0.10 (0.06) 0
µy 0.44 (0.16) 0.37 (0.15)
µr 0.35 (0.24) 0.43 (0.23)
Mexico (2002—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1527.6 -1560.7
Acceptance Rate (%) 20.86 22.69
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 4.19 5.12
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 1.60 2.04
µq 0.06 (0.04) 0
µy 0.10 (0.05) 0.01 (0.01)
µr 0.43 (0.30) 1.29 (0.33)
Peru (2005—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1437.1 -1399.8
Acceptance Rate (%) 29.18 15.97
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 6.67 1.14
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 1.02 2.66
µq 0.11 (0.07) 0
µy 0.62 (0.23) 0.03 (0.02)
µr 0.85 (0.26) 1.78 (0.48)
Note: Estimates of the policy weights (relative to that of inflation, 1), µi with i = {q, y, r},
report the posterior mean, with the posterior standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 4: Bayesian Model Comparison —Complete Asset Markets
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µq> 0 µq= 0
Brazil (2004—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1502.7 -1472.6
Acceptance Rate (%) 16.35 11.74
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 29.83 6.13
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 0.00 0.03
µq 0.02 (0.01) 0
µy 0.17 (0.06) 0.11 (0.07)
µr 0.88 (0.08) 0.31 (0.13)
Chile (2002—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1665.6 -1771.5
Acceptance Rate (%) 0.26 20.00
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 42.06 23.78
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 0.00 0.00
µq 0.03 (0.02) 0
µy 0.83 (0.05) 0.83 (0.12)
µr 0.81 (0.07) 0.63 (0.07)
Colombia (2003—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1596.3 -1584.4
Acceptance Rate (%) 4.17 46.03
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 43.29 4.09
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 0.09 0.25
µq 0.01 (0.00) 0
µy 0.35 (0.05) 0.21 (0.06) / 0.44 (0.19)
µr 0.66 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04) / 0.47 (0.27)
Mexico (2002—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1574.7 -1592.5
Acceptance Rate (%) 30.86 27.65
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 1.95 3.48
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 0.76 0.10
µq 0.37 (0.23) 0
µy 0.50 (0.28) 0.10 (0.06)
µr 0.54 (0.22) 0.57 (0.26)
Peru (2005—2014)
Marginal Likelihood -1523.1 -3202.8
Acceptance Rate (%) 8.02 2.58
Indeterminacy Rate (%) 33.07 93.03
Invalid Likelihood Rate (%) 0.00 0.00
µq 0.04 (0.02) 0
µy 0.22 (0.13) 0.06 (0.01)
µr 0.63 (0.18) 0.33 (0.01)
Note: Estimates of the policy weights (relative to that of inflation, 1), µi with i = {q, y, r},
report the posterior mean, with the posterior standard deviation in parentheses.
Table 5: Bayesian Model Comparison —Incomplete Asset Markets
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Parameters Post Mean Post SD 2.5% 97.5% NSE (8%) G p-value B-GF
Structural Parameters
h 0.30 0.10 0.19 0.93 0.01 0.53 1.00
σ 1.82 0.39 0.27 2.19 0.09 0.76 1.00
φ 1.51 0.26 1.05 2.03 0.01 0.86 1.00
η 1.18 0.47 0.27 2.19 0.05 0.00 1.01
δH 0.85 0.08 0.25 0.98 0.01 0.00 1.01
δF 0.80 0.16 0.25 0.98 0.03 0.01 1.02
θH 0.93 0.02 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 1.02
θF 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.20 1.01
a1 0.93 0.01 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.01
b2 0.79 0.10 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.09 1.00
c3 0.83 0.03 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.00
ρa 0.80 0.07 0.13 0.87 0.01 0.00 1.00
ρq 0.90 0.12 0.23 1.00 0.02 0.00 1.08
ρs 0.32 0.10 0.01 0.73 0.01 0.62 1.05
Relative Policy Target Weights
µq 0.31 0.12 0.09 1.24 0.02 0.00 1.08
µy 0.73 0.22 0.09 1.24 0.04 0.00 1.05
µr 0.53 0.30 0.09 1.24 0.07 0.00 1.10
Standard Deviation of Shock Innovations
σH 10.38 2.92 0.91 7.34 0.75 0.00 1.02
σF 23.96 0.82 0.91 7.33 0.10 0.12 1.02
σa 1.89 0.59 0.52 2.66 0.07 0.96 1.03
σq 0.83 0.26 0.32 0.88 0.02 0.06 1.00
σs 15.33 1.43 0.52 2.66 0.33 0.00 1.02
σπ∗ 0.56 0.10 0.52 2.66 0.00 0.00 1.00
σy∗ 0.72 0.11 0.52 2.66 0.00 0.00 1.00
σr∗ 0.54 0.08 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.01 1.00
σr 0.40 0.12 0.52 2.67 0.01 0.00 1.00
Note: Calibrated parameters: β = 0.99; α = 0.20.
Table 6: Brazil, CAM —Posterior Parameters and Convergence Diagnostics
(µq > 0)
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Parameters Post Mean Post SD 2.5% 97.5% NSE (8%) G p-value B-GF
Structural Parameters
h 0.91 0.02 0.19 0.93 0.00 0.00 1.07
σ 0.20 0.05 0.27 2.20 0.01 0.00 1.20
φ 1.87 0.22 1.05 2.03 0.02 0.00 1.06
η 0.11 0.04 0.27 2.19 0.00 0.00 1.00
δH 0.39 0.07 0.25 0.98 0.01 0.04 1.03
δF 0.27 0.07 0.25 0.98 0.01 0.89 1.01
θH 0.60 0.03 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 1.06
θF 0.61 0.03 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 1.02
a1 0.98 0.00 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.34 1.02
b2 0.75 0.09 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.01
c3 0.89 0.03 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.01 1.04
ρa 0.27 0.14 0.13 0.87 0.03 0.00 1.11
ρq 0.88 0.14 0.24 1.00 0.04 0.00 1.48
ρs 0.72 0.08 0.01 0.72 0.01 0.04 1.01
Relative Policy Target Weights
µq 0.31 0.11 0.09 1.24 0.03 0.00 1.07
µy 0.17 0.09 0.09 1.24 0.02 0.00 1.03
µr 1.14 0.39 0.09 1.24 0.11 0.68 1.69
Standard Deviation of Shock Innovations
σH 0.80 0.38 0.91 7.33 0.06 0.00 1.03
σF 9.27 0.83 0.91 7.36 0.19 0.00 1.04
σa 8.53 0.86 0.52 2.66 0.21 0.00 1.00
σq 0.79 0.18 0.32 0.87 0.01 0.01 1.01
σs 12.80 0.94 0.52 2.66 0.21 0.00 1.26
σπ∗ 0.22 0.03 0.52 2.66 0.00 0.52 1.00
σy∗ 0.86 0.10 0.52 2.66 0.01 0.01 1.00
σr∗ 0.20 0.02 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.98 1.00
σr 0.27 0.04 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.07 1.00
Note: Calibrated parameters: β = 0.99; α = 0.51.
Table 7: Chile, CAM —Posterior Parameters and Convergence Diagnostics
(µq > 0)
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Parameters Post Mean Post SD 2.5% 97.5% NSE (8%) G p-value B-GF
Structural Parameters
h 0.40 0.15 0.19 0.93 0.03 0.53 1.10
σ 1.77 0.52 0.27 2.19 0.13 0.01 1.09
φ 1.49 0.25 1.05 2.03 0.01 0.78 1.00
η 0.79 0.28 0.27 2.19 0.02 0.08 1.00
δH 0.77 0.08 0.25 0.98 0.01 0.00 1.06
δF 0.14 0.08 0.25 0.98 0.01 0.01 1.01
θH 0.95 0.01 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.76 1.00
θF 0.31 0.05 0.13 0.87 0.01 0.00 1.02
a1 0.94 0.01 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.35 1.00
b2 0.75 0.11 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.83 1.00
c3 0.83 0.03 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.55 1.00
ρa 0.60 0.10 0.13 0.87 0.01 0.02 1.00
ρq 0.86 0.23 0.23 1.00 0.05 0.01 1.13
ρs 0.21 0.08 0.01 0.72 0.01 0.03 1.02
Relative Policy Target Weights
µq 0.10 0.06 0.09 1.24 0.01 0.01 1.00
µy 0.44 0.16 0.09 1.24 0.02 0.01 1.03
µr 0.35 0.24 0.09 1.24 0.05 0.00 1.03
Standard Deviation of Shock Innovations
σH 22.89 1.44 0.91 7.36 0.33 0.90 1.06
σF 24.22 0.61 0.91 7.37 0.10 0.00 1.09
σa 2.01 0.70 0.52 2.65 0.10 0.17 1.01
σq 0.67 0.16 0.32 0.88 0.01 0.28 1.00
σs 10.71 1.31 0.52 2.66 0.26 0.39 1.05
σπ∗ 0.37 0.06 0.52 2.66 0.00 0.02 1.01
σy∗ 0.78 0.10 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.23 1.01
σr∗ 0.53 0.07 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.36 1.00
σr 0.34 0.07 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.01 1.00
Note: Calibrated parameters: β = 0.99; α = 0.29.
Table 8: Colombia, CAM —Posterior Parameters and Convergence Diag-
nostics (µq > 0)
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Parameters Post Mean Post SD 2.5% 97.5% NSE (8%) G p-value B-GF
Structural Parameters
h 0.37 0.09 0.19 0.93 0.01 0.47 1.00
σ 1.15 0.20 0.27 2.19 0.05 0.00 1.51
φ 1.47 0.25 1.05 2.03 0.01 0.75 1.00
η 0.67 0.31 0.27 2.19 0.04 0.00 1.09
δH 0.87 0.09 0.25 0.98 0.02 0.07 1.04
δF 0.63 0.16 0.25 0.98 0.04 0.00 1.08
θH 0.98 0.00 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 1.04
θF 0.92 0.02 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 1.01
a1 0.97 0.01 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.03
b2 0.82 0.07 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.24 1.00
c3 0.82 0.04 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.03 1.01
ρa 0.64 0.07 0.13 0.87 0.01 0.95 1.00
ρq 0.66 0.25 0.23 1.00 0.07 0.00 1.48
ρs 0.33 0.18 0.01 0.73 0.04 0.14 1.00
Relative Policy Target Weights
µq 0.06 0.04 0.09 1.24 0.00 0.33 1.05
µy 0.10 0.05 0.10 1.24 0.01 0.04 1.00
µr 0.43 0.30 0.09 1.24 0.08 0.00 1.70
Standard Deviation of Shock Innovations
σH 22.95 1.19 0.91 7.31 0.31 0.59 1.25
σF 21.92 1.12 0.91 7.34 0.28 0.00 1.00
σa 14.28 0.82 0.52 2.66 0.19 0.01 1.02
σq 0.49 0.10 0.32 0.87 0.01 0.03 1.00
σs 0.39 0.11 0.52 2.65 0.01 0.94 1.01
σπ∗ 0.22 0.03 0.52 2.66 0.00 0.00 1.00
σy∗ 0.62 0.07 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.93 1.00
σr∗ 0.21 0.02 0.52 2.66 0.00 0.32 1.00
σr 0.37 0.06 0.52 2.66 0.01 0.44 1.01
Note: Calibrated parameters: β = 0.99; α = 0.44.
Table 9: Mexico, CAM —Posterior Parameters and Convergence Diagnos-
tics (µq > 0)
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Parameters Post Mean Post SD 2.5% 97.5% NSE (8%) G p-value B-GF
Structural Parameters
h 0.38 0.18 0.19 0.93 0.02 0.03 1.00
σ 0.01 0.01 0.27 2.19 0.00 0.00 1.00
φ 1.58 0.29 1.05 2.03 0.04 0.00 1.03
η 1.22 0.65 0.27 2.19 0.03 0.13 1.00
δH 0.75 0.18 0.25 0.98 0.02 0.00 1.00
δF 0.38 0.21 0.25 0.98 0.03 0.00 1.05
θH 0.18 0.08 0.13 0.87 0.01 0.00 1.00
θF 0.52 0.05 0.13 0.87 0.01 0.00 1.23
a1 0.80 0.10 0.19 0.96 0.01 0.00 1.01
b2 0.85 0.08 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.10 1.00
c3 0.74 0.05 0.19 0.96 0.00 0.00 1.00
ρa 0.86 0.07 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.56 1.00
ρq 0.71 0.28 0.23 1.00 0.05 0.54 1.00
ρs 0.30 0.14 0.01 0.72 0.02 0.76 1.00
Relative Policy Target Weights
µy 0.03 0.02 0.09 1.24 0.00 0.00 1.01
µr 1.78 0.48 0.09 1.24 0.11 0.29 1.04
Standard Deviation of Shock Innovations
σH 3.28 0.96 0.91 7.32 0.18 0.00 1.06
σF 11.03 2.46 0.91 7.33 0.55 0.00 1.00
σa 13.10 2.06 0.52 2.66 0.48 0.00 1.38
σq 18.96 2.95 0.32 0.87 0.71 0.06 1.19
σs 8.37 1.01 0.52 2.65 0.13 0.32 1.00
σπ∗ 0.30 0.05 0.52 2.65 0.00 0.00 1.00
σy∗ 0.59 0.09 0.52 2.66 0.00 0.00 1.00
σr∗ 0.25 0.03 0.52 2.67 0.00 0.00 1.00
σr 0.42 0.13 0.52 2.66 0.02 0.00 1.01
Note: Calibrated parameters: β = 0.99; α = 0.35.
Table 10: Peru, CAM —Posterior Parameters and Convergence Diagnostics
(µq = 0)
